Nexus StandardsDigital, Cyber and AIHazard and threat families
Area · registry row planned

Cyber and digital risk standards

Cyber threats exploit shared software, cloud concentration and interconnected supply chains, so one vulnerability or provider outage can propagate across thousands of organisations and sectors at once. This section of the Digital, Cyber and AI subsite sets records for threat intelligence, vulnerabilities, software supply-chain attestations and incidents, built on open exchange formats, so that defenders and supervisors share evidence that can be verified rather than asserted. Every artifact of the area carries a UNI (Unique Nexus Identifier), which identifies and never certifies.

UNI
requested · not yet allocated
Status
PROPOSEDregistry row · planned · scope NSF
Last reviewed
area context bank
Cite this page

Nexus Standards (2026). Cyber and digital risk standards: area brief, Digital, Cyber and AI (PROPOSED). https://nexustandards.com/digital-ai/cyber-and-digital-risk-standards/. Last reviewed 2026-10-17.

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01Scope

Cyber and digital risk standards: what the area covers, and what it leaves to others.

The hazard and threat families section of Digital, Cyber and AI. Scope as the area context entry states it (PROPOSED).

In scope 5

  • Threat intelligence records in STIX and TAXII
  • Vulnerability and advisory records (CVE, CSAF, VEX) with scoring
  • Software supply-chain attestations (SLSA, in-toto, SBOM)
  • Incident records with impact and dependency mapping
  • Zero-trust control evidence for NS-11 verification

Out of scope 3

  • Offensive security techniques or exploit code
  • Law-enforcement attribution of attacks
  • Product security testing and vendor rankings

Jurisdictions No jurisdiction note is recorded for this area yet; jurisdiction narrows what applies and never implies that a Nexus profile satisfies a law.

02Hazards and sectors

What acts on this area, and who carries it.

Hazards and threats 5

RansomwareSoftware supply-chain compromiseCloud and service-provider outagesAttacks on industrial control systemsData breaches

Sectors 4

Digital, telecom and platformsFinance, insurance and capital marketsHealth systemsEnergy utilities and grids
03Data and feeds

4 sources, with provider, licence and delivery path.

Sources the area reads or proposes. Delivery follows GRIx first; a source is shown live only after an owner decision admits it for public pages.

Every feed · pending admission

No legal register row admits any of these sources for live display on public pages yet, so nothing is read from them here. A register row that exists records the source for the governed GRIx path; admission for public pages is a separate owner decision.

Admitted
0
none yet
Register row exists
0
recorded for the GRIx path
Proposed row
4
terms to be recorded
Delivery
3 GRIx · 0 plugin · 0 browser · 1 snapshot
GRIx first, then plugin, browser-direct, snapshot
04Systemic couplings

4 couplings to other areas and subsites.

Each coupling names the mechanism that links this area to another; select a card on the canvas to trace it. Mechanisms are stated in the context bank (PROPOSED).

Canvas · the area and its couplingsDesign, not a record
Cyber and digital risk standards: systemic couplingsThe couplings the area context bank records for Cyber and digital risk standards: 1 area in Digital, Cyber and AI, 3 areas in other subsites and 3 subsites reached. Each coupling carries a mechanism stated in the context bank (PROPOSED); a reading aid, not a dependency proof.

Fig.RUNNING marks the area you are reading; DONE an area in the same subsite, QUEUED an area elsewhere and GATE a subsite reached. Tags give reading order only, never a status. Design, not a record.

  1. Financial and economic risk standardsFinance, Insurance and the EconomyCascade: attacks on payment systems or major institutions transmit to market confidence and liquidity.
  2. Critical infrastructure and critical entitiesEnergy and Critical InfrastructureCascade: compromise of operational technology disrupts power, water and health services.
  3. Information integrity and trustGovernance, Security and SocietyCommon driver: intrusion and influence operations combine in hybrid campaigns.
  4. Cyber resilience and digital operational resilienceDigital, Cyber and AIMechanism: resilience obligations consume the threat and vulnerability records defined here.
06Restricted compatibility profiles

2 closed standards, named only.

Closed or paywalled standards appear by name and link only; any compatibility profile of one is built on simulated data and kept on protected pages until an institutional arrangement with the issuing body is recorded. Nexus Standards is not affiliated with, endorsed by or certified by any standards body named here.

07Nexus Standards that apply

5 Nexus Standards for this area.

The Nexus Standards the area context entry lists; the registry row lists NS-0, NS-9, NS-10, NS-11, NS-12. Every one is proposed or specified; none is adopted by an authority.

  1. 01

    NS-0 · Constitution and principles

    Status proposed · 12 rules stated. Read NS-0 · The rules for this area

  2. 02

    NS-9 · Contextual UNIs (deployments, instances, programme instances)

    Status proposed · 5 rules stated. Read NS-9 · The rules for this area

  3. 03

    NS-10 · Policies and clauses (machine-readable obligations, enforcement in commons and command rooms)

    Status proposed · 7 rules stated. Read NS-10 · The rules for this area

  4. 04

    NS-11 · Verification and monitoring (evidence, attestations, zero-trust conformance observation)

    Status proposed · 6 rules stated. Read NS-11 · The rules for this area

  5. 05

    NS-12 · Software, model and AI/ML artifacts (supply chain, model cards, dataset sheets)

    Status proposed · 4 rules stated. Read NS-12 · The rules for this area

08Indicators

2 indicators the area tracks.

10Readiness

What each pathway can read from this area.

GCRI Canada evidence pathway

GCRI Canada

GCRI Canada may admit incident and vulnerability records with source, timestamp and verification status as research evidence on digital systemic risk; GCRI Canada decides under its own evidence and research rules, and no approval is implied.

Open the GCRI Canada evidence pathway

Recognition pathway

The Global Risks Forum (GRF)

GRF may record organisations that publish attestations and advisories on the shared profiles as a trust dialogue item; GRF decides under its own recognition rules, and no recognition or endorsement is implied.

Open the Recognition pathway

Capital pathway

The Global Risks Alliance (GRA)

GRA may read supply-chain attestation and control-evidence records when it considers digital risk in investments; GRA decides under its own capital-readiness rules, and no approval, rating or investment view is implied.

Open the Capital pathway

Each institution decides under its own rules what it reads as evidence; no pathway is an approval, a readiness statement or investment advice.

11Working group

The working-group charter, proposed.

Scope

Threat, vulnerability, attestation and incident records on open exchange formats, with control evidence for verification.

No working group is chartered yet; a community may charter this one under NS-13 through a docket.

Deliverables · 3
  1. Incident record with dependency and impact fields
  2. Attestation profile (SLSA, in-toto, SBOM) tied to UNIs
  3. Control-evidence crosswalk to CSF 2.0 in OSCAL (names only for closed catalogues)
Liaison targets · 4
  • OASIS Cyber Threat Intelligence TC liaison sought
  • OpenSSF liaison sought
  • FIRST liaison sought
  • ENISA liaison sought
12Open problems

3 open problems an expert would start with.

  1. Concentration risk in cloud and software dependencies is poorly measured; no open dataset maps systemic dependencies across sectors.
  2. Incident disclosure is inconsistent across jurisdictions and often delayed, limiting evidence for systemic analysis.
  3. CVSS scores describe severity, not risk in context, and are frequently misused as risk measures.
13Audiences

Who works with this area: 4 audiences.

  1. Security operations and threat intelligence teams
  2. Product security teams
  3. Supervisors of digital operational resilience
  4. Open-source maintainers
14Registry depth

The registry row: scope NSF, 5 crosswalk domains.

This area has a row in registry/subsites.yaml (status planned), so it carries five depth pages and the register crosswalk of its domains.

Crosswalk graph · cyber and digital riskFrom the registry
Cyber and digital risk: the register crosswalk86 nodes on four orbits (Nexus Standards and consumers inside, then domains, external standards and issuing bodies) joined by 128 register links.
Nexus StandardsDomainsExternal standardsIssuing bodiesConsumers

5 Nexus Standards · 5 domains · 50 external standards · 25 issuing bodies · 1 consumers. Relations are register entries (adopt, profile, crosswalk, cite), never compliance claims; names belong to their stewards.

Crosswalk graph86 nodes and 128 links from registry/external-standards.yaml, registry/subsites.yaml and registry/consumers.yaml. Relations (adopt, profile, crosswalk, cite) are register entries, never compliance claims.

The registry holds no geography for the area itself: areas are not places. The one geography it implies is where the bodies that issue the area's external standards sit.

Standards globe · Cyber and digital risk: issuing bodiesFrom the registry
Where the issuing bodies of the external standards register sitA plate carrée world map with Natural Earth coastlines, H3 resolution 2 hexagons at the public seats of 18 issuing bodies and one dot per seat. 50 register entries.
Issuing bodies' seats (18)H3 cells, resolution 2 (7); darker, more register entriesSubsites, consumers, standards: no geography in the registry
Issuing bodies and their seats (18)
BodySeatRegister entries
NISTGaithersburg, Maryland, United States11
ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42Geneva, Switzerland6
European Parliament and CouncilBrussels, Belgium4
ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27Geneva, Switzerland4
IEEE Standards AssociationPiscataway, New Jersey, United States3
OASIS Cyber Threat Intelligence TCWoburn, Massachusetts, United States2
Agentic AI Foundation (Linux Foundation)San Francisco, California, United States1
CEN-CENELEC JTC 21Brussels, Belgium1
CISA (US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency)Washington, District of Columbia, United States1
FIRST CVSS Special Interest GroupCary, North Carolina, United States1
IETFWilmington, Delaware, United States1
IETF and OpenID FoundationWilmington, Delaware, United States1
ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 7Geneva, Switzerland1
ISO/TC 292Geneva, Switzerland1
OASIS CSAF TCWoburn, Massachusetts, United States1
OpenSSF (Linux Foundation)San Francisco, California, United States1
OpenVEX community (OpenSSF project)San Francisco, California, United States1
UN Office of the Secretary-General's Envoy on Technology and UNDPNew York, New York, United States1

1 subsites: no geography in the registry (areas, not places) · 2 consumers: repositories, no geography · 19 Nexus Standards: documents, no geography · 7 issuing bodies without a fixed public seat, listed not drawn: Mitchell et al. (FAT* 2019); World Customs Organization; OECD; UNESCO; United Nations; International Atomic Energy Agency; and more · Programme regions of the ecosystem coverage register: named, not drawn (no coordinates in the registry)

Standards globe18 issuing bodies with a public seat, 50 register entries, H3 cells at resolutions 1 to 4. Seats are city coordinates, not registry fields; subsites, consumers and standards have no geography, so none is drawn. Plate carrée still map; globe with script.

Area on the sitesArtifact kindsGoverning standardsPages
Ransomware, critical infrastructure attacks, data breaches, AI misusedata, dataset, model, map, reportNS-1, NS-3, NS-3b, NS-5therisk.global/challenges/
Cyber and digital resilience (GCRI Canada field gateway; GRF and GRA counterparts)data, dataset, report, map, documentationNS-1, NS-3, NS-3b, NS-4, NS-5therisk.global/fields/cyber/

From the ecosystem coverage register: what the GCRI Canada, The Global Risks Forum (GRF) and The Global Risks Alliance (GRA) sites publish on this area, as claimed there and not evaluated here.

15References

3 sourced references.

Peer-reviewed sources and published statistics on the publishers' own domains, as the context entry cites them. No Risk Academy faculty pathway is linked to this area yet; one is linked when a faculty publishes a pathway that fits.

  1. peer-reviewedCybersecurity in an Era with Quantum Computers: Will We Be Ready?IEEE Security & Privacy · 2018
  2. published statisticsPrinciples for Operational ResilienceBasel Committee on Banking Supervision · 2021
  3. published statisticsCyber LexiconFinancial Stability Board · 2018
16Key terms

Terms used on this page.

UNI
Unique Nexus Identifier: identifies and resolves an artifact and its record; it never certifies truth, readiness or approval.
PROPOSED
Drafted content that no authority has adopted. Every area entry here is a proposal to the Nexus Standards registry.
adopt
Relation: the external standard is used as published, values validated against it.
cite
Relation: the external standard is cited by identifier and URL as a reference.
crosswalk
Relation: Nexus clauses are mapped to parts of the external standard by number, never by text.
compatibility profile (restricted)
Relation to a closed or paywalled standard: named and linked only; any profile is simulated and kept on protected pages.
pending admission
No legal register row admits this source for display on public pages yet, so nothing is read from it.
GRIx
The governed data layer of Nexus Foundry: external data is read through it with its licence and source release.
docket
A public change record under NS-13, decided by editors with written reasons.
attestation
An evaluator's recorded result for one clause and one subject under NS-11; never a certification.
liaison sought
A liaison the working group would ask the body for; none is held unless the body confirms it in writing.
18Learn and apply

Where Cyber and digital risk standards is taught, worked on and run.

Risk Academy disciplines that teach Cyber and digital risk standards, with their courses; the GCRI Canada, The Global Risks Forum (GRF) and The Global Risks Alliance (GRA) subsites that carry those disciplines; and the Nexus Foundry systems the standards name. Mappings are proposed for review (Risk Academy standards map, 2026-10-17); a link says a page on the same subject exists, never an endorsement or a conformance statement; framework names in course titles are named and linked, never reproduced.

Risk Academy

Disciplines and courses

19Questions

Questions and answers.

Is the Cyber and digital risk standards area adopted?
No. The area entry is PROPOSED content for the Nexus Standards registry beside its registry row. Adoption of any standard is a recorded authority decision and none is recorded today.
Are the feeds on this page live?
No. Every feed is pending admission: no legal register row admits it for public pages yet, so nothing is read from it here.
How do I change this brief?
Through a docket under NS-13: a pull request against the area context bank or the registry, decided by editors with written reasons.
Nexus Standards

Shape this brief: Cyber and digital risk standards.

Propose a change, join the working group or name a source. Area entries are PROPOSED content for the Nexus Standards registry; a UNI identifies and never certifies, and nothing on this site is a certification, an approval or a readiness statement.

Nexus Standards documents CC BY 4.0 · tooling Apache-2.0 · counsel review pending (DEC-2026-10-16-NEXUS-STANDARDS-OPEN-LICENCE). External standards are named and linked under their own licences; a UNI (Unique Nexus Identifier) identifies, it never certifies. · Generated from the Nexus Standards corpus at commit 437ae044c5cb (2026-10-17); proposed and open.

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